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I. INTRODUCTION

Stranger. Third party. Nonparent. All three of these titles are
meaningless to a child who loves her mother. The child has a different name
for this stranger. She calls her "mommy." She calls the stranger by that
name because that is who she has been told this person is by her relatives,
her biological mother, and even by the stranger herself.
She also calls the stranger mommy because the stranger has been there
for her throughout her short, yet fulfilling life. She has cooked, played
games, tucked her into bed, told her bedtime stories, and taught her all that
she knows about the world in which she lives. The child does not know that
her mother is denied the legal right to care for her, but she feels the effect
when her mother is taken away from her. She may not understand why her
mother cannot see her anymore, but she knows that for the rest of her life,
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
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whether or not she ever sees her mother again, she will never think of her as
a stranger.
The lesbian nonbiological mother, sometimes called the "other mother"
or "psychological parent," is often treated in court as a stranger to her
children So long as she and the biological mother remain a couple, the well
being of the children remains intact and the relationship between mother and
child is protected. 2 However, in the event3 of death or separation, the lesbian
mother can lose all contact with her child.
Although the interest and participation of lesbian partners in donor
insemination have continued to rise since its introduction, the legal system
has been resistant to align itself with the medical field when it comes to
recognizing the family created by this procedure.4 Florida has treated this
type of family as anything but how they have attempted to define
themselves, likening the situation instead to a grandparent verses parent
visitation rights case.5 This state has removed the other mother from the
family unit and treated her as an outsider, as if she was never considered to
be a parent from the start.
The true irony of this situation is that the state, in implementing this
standard, uses the same reasoning to support it as is used to allow for the
creation of the family-the fundamental right to privacy.6 The right to
privacy in child bearing allows for artificial insemination of a woman in a
lesbian relationship. The state cannot demand that she not have a child
because she is gay. But then, after fostering this relationship, the state once
again uses the right to privacy, this time in child rearing, to forbid the other
mother from maintaining a relationship with her child. In other words, the
same right-the fundamental right to privacy-is used both as the creation
and destruction of a family. 7
This article will examine the recent decisions in Florida based upon this
fundamental right that have destroyed a lesbian nonbiological mother's
chances of maintaining a relationship with her child after separating from the
1.
E.g. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
2.
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Recognizing Gay and Lesbian Families: Marriage and
ParentalRights, 5 LAW & SExuALitY 513, 513-14 (1995).
3.
Id. at 514.
4.
See Diane K. Shah & Linda Walters, Lesbian Mothers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12,
1979, at 61.
5.
See Kazmierazak,736 So. 2d at 107.
6.
See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 513 (Fla. 1998); Kazmierazak,736 So. 2d
at 109.
7.
This right to privacy is found in both the United States Constitution and the

Florida Constitution. However, as this note will discuss, the Florida Constitution speaks
expressly to the right to privacy. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 23.
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biological mother. It will propose a test that, in spite of the recent decisions
stripping a lesbian mother of her rights, will carve out a path for her to
continue to be a mother to her children. This new path will avoid a
restructuring of well-settled principles of family law in Florida. Part II of
this article will discuss the nontraditional types of parenthood recognized by
law. Part I consists of a discussion of the Florida Statutes and case law
affecting the nonbiological lesbian mother. Part IV will examine a recent
Florida case concerning custody rights between the mothers of a child. Part
V will discuss why there is no legal label that can truly identify the role of a
nonbiological lesbian mother to her daughter. In Part VI of this article,
Wisconsin's answer for the lesbian mother will be examined to see how that
state handled a problem that its statutes had not addressed. It will
demonstrate how the test created in Wisconsin can be altered slightly to fit
the needs of Florida. Part VII will conclude this article.

II. THE LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PARENT
As a starting point, it is important to understand the definition and
rights of a parent verses those of a nonparent. A parent is "[t]he lawful
father or mother of a person."8 The definition suggests that:
[Tihe word comprehends much more than mere fact of who was
responsible for the child's conception and birth and is commonly
understood to describe or refer to a person or persons who share
mutual love and affection with a child and who supply 9child
support and maintenance, instruction, discipline and guidance.
"Parent" includes the natural or biological mother and father of a child
and parenthood created through adoption.' "Biological parent" is "a parent
who has conceived or sired a child rather than adopted a child and whose
genes are therefore transmitted to the child." I An adoptive parent does not
have biological ties to the child but has gone through the legal process of
becoming
a parent. 2 Florida statutory law has also defined "parent" as
13
such.
The definition of nonparent is not found in the dictionary per se.
However, the prefix "non" means not and implies the negative of that which
8.

BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY

9.
10.

Id.
See id.

11.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRDGED

12.

See id. at 27.

13.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (1999).
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it precedes. 14 This would therefore make the term nonparent meaning the
reverse of one who brings up or cares for another. Nonparents who care for
and raise children know that this classification is anything but accurate.
Both a parent and a nonparent can essentially perform the same
functions for a child. Many times, the nonparent has a closer relationship
with the child than does the parent. However, the parent has legal ties to the
child whereas the nonparent does not. Because of this distinction, numerous
theories of parentage have emerged in an attempt to maintain the relationship
between a nonparent and the child that the nonparent has raised.
A nonparent must first acquire standing to fight for custody or visitation
of his or her child.15 In order to acquire standing to fight for parental rights,
nonparents must first show that they have created a relationship with their
child whereby they have assumed the role of the child's parent. If this can
be proven, the law affords alternatives to these parents who do not share
biological or adoptive ties with their children. 17 Nonparents may attempt to
meet the standing requirement by proving that they are either a psychological
parent, that they stand in loco parentis with their child, or that they are an
equitable parent.1
A.

PsychologicalParent

A psychological parent, also called a de facto parent, is "'one who, on a
continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as
the child's physical needs." ' 19 The psychological parent theory was first
used in legal proceedings in 1963. 20 At that time, the theory was described
as "'mutual interaction between adult and child, which might be described in
such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confidence."'

14.

RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1306-07 (2d ed. 1993).

15. See Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother:
Legally Recognizing the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her
Child,43 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 187 (1991).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Theresa A. Nitti, Comment, Stepping Back from the Psychological Parenting
Theory: A Comment On In Re J.C., 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1994) (quoting JOSPEH
GoLDsTEINE. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OFTHE CHILD 98 (2d ed. 1979)).
20. Id. at 1010.
21. Id. at 1010 n.57 (quoting Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody
Disputes Involving Third Parties,73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963)).
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The psychological bond may, if the two are separated, lead to
socialization problems for the child.22 This is because the bond is formed
through daily interaction between the parent and the child.Y
The
psychological parent theory often occurs when children are placed in foster
care. This theory of parenthood does not protect parental autonomy. It
can be a problem because the parents who are recognized by law do not have
to intend to have this relationship develop between their child and26 another in
order for a third party to assume the role of psychological parent.
B.

In Loco Parentis

Similar to the psychological parent theory is the in loco parentis
doctrine, wherein "a person who intentionally provides support or takes
custody without adopting may incur the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood." 27 This relationship is often created by marriage and terminated
by divorce.2 8 However, some courts have extended the relationship, rights,
and obligations past the termination of marriage.29
The theory is that the person stands in the shoes of an already existing
parent.30 This most likely occurs in situations where there is a stepparent
that cares for the children of the spouse. That person, although not the
biological or adoptive parent, acts like the child's parent. Furthermore, the
stepparent in assuming this roll, takes the place of an already existing parent.
The nonparent gains standing through the marriage, which has created the in
loco parentisrelationship.
The in loco parentis relationship can occur without the consent of the
biological parent.
The relationship is also nonexclusive, meaning, "the
doctrine does not arbitrarily limit
' 3 2the gender or number of people who may
stand in loco parentisto a child.

22. Id.at100-11.
23. Id.
24. See Nitti, supra note 19, at 1010-11.
25. Lisa M. Pooley, Note, Heterosexism and Children'sBest Interests: Conflicting
Conceptsin Nancy S. v. Michele G., 27 U.S.F. L. Rav. 477,487 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Kovacs, supra note 2, at 523.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30.
31.
32.

Delaney, supra note 15, at 194.
Pooley, supra note 25, at 488.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2000

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 7

Nova Law Review

C.

[Vol. 24:907

EquitableParent

An equitable parent, although not the biological or adoptive parent of
the child, "desires such recognition, is willing to accept the obligations of
supporting the child and in return wants the 'reciprocal rights' of custody
and visitation. 3 3 This doctrine has its roots in the doctrine of equitable
estoppel and equitable adoption. 34 The comparison creates a type of
parenthood by action:
Equitable estoppel is the doctrine that a person may be precluded
by his actions, conduct, or silence when he is obligated to speak,
from asserting a right that he otherwise would have possessed.
Fundamental fairness prevents a party from benefiting from prior
inconsistent
conduct upon which others have relied to their
35
detriment.

In terms of family law, equitable parenthood is the result of a nonparent
who because of prior conduct and actions, is estopped from claiming
36
nonparenthood . Therefore, because others have relied on the nonparent's
actions as a parent, the nonparent is precluded from claiming that he or she
is not a parent. This title is often given to people who hold themselves out to
be parents and then deny biological ties.37 However, in the context of
lesbian parents, it is the nonparent who most often tries to label herself as an
equitable parent.38
Unlike the psychological parent and the in loco parentis relationship,
equitable parenthood cannot be created without the consent of the legally
recognized parent. 39 The circumstances giving rise to the equitable parent
4
relationship
must estoppel
be created
by thecannot
legallyberecognized
used.4 1 parent. 0 If they are
not, the equitable
doctrine
33. See Delaney, supra note 15, at 201-02.
34. Id. at 202.
35. Id. (footnotes omitted). Equitable adoption refers to an oral contract to adopt a
child which is fully performed, resulting in a legal adoption usually for the purposes of
inheritance. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Delaney, supra note 15, at 201-02.
38. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991). Michele
G.'s attempt to classify herself as an equitable parent was unsuccessful as it had never been
applied as a title for the challenger of parental rights. Id.
39. Pooley, supra note 25, at 488.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Because lesbian couples are incapable of creating a child with
biological ties to only the two of them, when the couple wants to start a
family, a decision must be made concerning donor insemination.42 Couples
often choose one parent to be the birth mother and then choose a donor with
similar characteristics to the other mother.43 When lesbian couples separate,
after years of planning and raising a family, it is not uncommon for the
estranged pair to disagree about custody and visitation arrangements. The
legal system's willingness to recognize the rights of the nonparent, or other
mother, has not been as generously applied to lesbian parents as to
heterosexual "other mothers." 44 The nonbiological mother has traditionally
had to prove that she has rights to her child by classifying herself as one of
the titles above, mainly a psychological parent.

III. FLORIDA LAW CONCERNING THE LESBIAN MOTHER
In Florida, a lesbian mother, who through donor insemination of her
partner, planned for and raised a child, is banned from creating a legal
relationship with her family. 6 Although such a lesbian mother is anything
but a stranger to her child, the law treats her as one.47
A.

FloridaStatutes

Because the lesbian other mother has not given birth to her child, they
share no biological ties. Statutory law in Florida does not permit her to
adopt her child because of her sexual orientation." Section 63.042(3) of the
FloridaStatutes allows adoption by married and single persons whether they
are adults or minors. 9 This same statute forbids a lesbian woman in a long-

42. Shah & Walters, supra note 4, at 61. But see Kyle C. Velte, Note, Egging On
Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-GameticIn Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. .
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 431,434 (1999). New reproductive technology called Tri-Gametic In
Vitro Fertilization creates an embryo with the genetic combination of two women. Id. Even with
this technology, the couple still requires a sperm donor to complete fertilization.
43. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 98-2854).

44. See, e.g., Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
45. Delaney, supra note 15, at 187. The author noted that even when the lesbian
parent proves that she is a psychological parent to her child, she is often times not afforded the
same rights as the biological mother. Id.
46. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).
47. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212.
48. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
49.

Id.
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l she planned for and
term committed relationshipa homosexual.
from adopting the
t child
she is
raised solely because
Statutory law in Florida also forbids homosexuals from marrying.
Section 741.212(1) of the Florida Statutes states that "[m]arriages between
persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, whether within or
outside the State of Florida... are not recognized for any purpose in this
state.,,52 In prohibiting homosexuals to marry, it has been noted that Florida
"denie[s] homosexuals the rights granted to married partners that flow
naturally from the marital relationship. 5 3 Notwithstanding the validity of
these statutes, Florida's acceptance of the creation of the lesbian parented
family through artificial insemination gives rise to a biased protection of one
mother over another.
B.

FloridaCase Law

In 1925, Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a child could not be taken4
away from its natural mother without a showing that the mother was unfit.5
Since that ruling, courts in Florida have been hesitant to recognize the role of
a psychological parent in terms of custody disputes. 5 Additionally, there
was often disagreement concerning the standard that would apply to these
proceedings. 56 In some cases, the courts accepted the showing of
psychological parenthood as meeting the standing requirement.5 7 In other
cases, courts held that a showing of demonstrable harm or unfitness was
required before the state could intervene in a person's private life concerning
58
child rearing.
Along with the noncohesive standing requirement, came the scattered
approach to deciding the proper test for a transfer of custody. In some
50.

51.
52.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
Id.

53. Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
54. Parker v. Gates, 103 So. 126 (Fla. 1925). Although Parker had allowed her son to
be in the custody of Gates for the greater part of his life, she had not relinquished her right to
custody of her child. Id. at 126.
55. See infra notes 57-59.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pinkey, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The
court reasoned that it was in the best interests of a teenage girl to remain with her foster
mother after her father was released from jail. Id. at 524. The decision was made after a
showing that the father had not been honest in his relationship with his daughter. Id.
58
Webb v. Webb, 546 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Paul v. Lusco, 530
So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Sandor v. Sandor, 444 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
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opinions, the courts used the best interests of the child standard. 59 In others,
the best interests of the child would only be considered after it was proven
that the child's welfare was at stake. 6° One district held that the law did not
recognize the role of psychological parents. 1
Throughout these decisions, the belief that the natural parent had a right
that was superior to all others challenging that parent for custody remained.
However, there was the opportunity for a nonparent to gain custody in
certain circumstances. 62 Despite this, lesbians, who considered themselves
to be psychological parents of their partners'
biological children, had been
63
unsuccessful in their fight for custody. But, prior to the Supreme Court of
Florida decision in Von Eiff v. Azicri,64 the lesbian other mother still had a
remote chance of persuading a court that she deserved to be considered in
the custody decisions of her child. 65 Although Von Eiff was a visitation
rights battle between the parents and grandparents of a child, the reasoning
behind the case and the resulting decision laid the groundwork for denying a
lesbian other mother rights to her child.6
1. Von Eiff v. Azicri
In Von Eiff, maternal grandparents sued their grandchildren's father and
his wife for visitation rights. 67 Von Eiff and the Azicri's daughter, Luisa,
were married and had a child the following year.68 Luisa died, and after Von
Eiff remarried, his new wife adopted the child.69 The grandparents sued for
visitation rights under section 752.01(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which

59. Simmons, 587 So. 2d at 524; Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Heffernan v. Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1971).
60. Paul,530 So. 2d at 364.
61. Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Swain v.
Swain, 567 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1990) (finding that "[tlhere is no such thing
[as a psychological parent] recognized in law," and that the duty to support children is only
laid upon natural and adoptive parents).
62. See, e.g., Simmons, 587 So. 2d at 524.
63. See Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1995) (holding
that a woman who planned to raise a child with her lesbian partner as the biological mother
was not considered a de facto parent).
64. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
65. Id. at 510.
66. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
67. Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 510.
68. Id. at 511.
69. Id.
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grants such visitation to grandparents in certain circumstances. 70 The Third
District Court of Appeal granted visitation to the grandparents, 1 however,
the following question was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida:
IS SECTION 752.01(l)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993),
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IMPERMISSIBLY INFRINGES ON PRIVACY RIGHTS PROTECTED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?2"
The Supreme Court of Florida answered affirmatively, and "focus[ed]
exclusively on whether it is proper for the government, in the absence of
demonstrated harm to the child, to force such interaction against the express
wishes of at least one parent." 73 The court reasoned that government
harm to
intervention in the life of a parent, absent a showing of demonstrable
74
privacy.
to
right
fundamental
parent's
that
violated
child,
the
The court began by reviewing the right to privacy in child rearing that is
offered by the United States Constitution.5 One of the liberties afforded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 7 6 is the right to
personal privacy.77 The court stated that it is "'clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government
interference are personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.'
Furthermore, there is a specific liberty afforded to parents concerning the
"'care, custody, and management"' of their children.75
After discussing the right to privacy granted by the United States
80
Constitution,the court explained the extra protection that Florida provides.
The right to privacy in Florida is not only protected by the United States
70. FLA. STAT. § 752.01(1)(a) (1999). Section 752.01(1)(a) of the FloridaStatutes
states that a court shall award reasonable visitation rights to grandparents when it is in the
child's best interests if one or both of the child's parents are deceased. Id.
71. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 512.
72. Id. at510-11.

73.

Id. at 511.

74.

Id. at 514.

75.

Id. at 513.

76.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

77.

Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 513. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678

(1977).
78. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 513 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 684-85 (1977)).

79.
80.

Id.(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
Id. at 514.
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Constitution.81 Article 1, section 23 of the Florida Constitution states that
"[e]very person has the right to be let alone and free from government
intrusion into his private life."8 2 The court concluded that Florida's explicit
right to privacy affords more protection than the implied federal right to
privacy in that it "is much broader in scope, embraces more privacy interests,
83
and extends more protection to those interests than its federal counterpart."
The court reasoned that because the right to privacy had been classified
as a fundamental right in Florida, the highest standard of scrutiny must be
applied when determining whether the government may infringe upon these
rights. 84 The state has the burden of justifying the intrusion of privacy by
showing that there is a compelling state interest.85 The state must prove that
the challenged regulation serves the compelling state
8 6 interest and that the
interest is served by using the least restrictive means.
The court stressed that the compelling state interest required to be
proven by the government before interference with a natural parent's
decision-maling was the existence of a "significant harm to the child
threatened by or resulting from those decisions."'
The court held that the
best interests of the child analysis can only be explored after the state
established significant harm. ss Therefore, the court concluded that section
752.01(1)(a) was unconstitutional because it granted visitation to
grandparents only upon a showing of the best interests of the child instead of
first requiring proof that the child had suffered demonstrable harm. 9
Furthermore, the court provided examples of compelling state
interests. 90 These interests included protecting children from the threat of
abuse, neglect and death,9 1 preventing sexual exploitation of children in the
home,92 and ensuring reasonable medical treatment for children. 93 Therefore,
there are many different circumstances that can cause demonstrable harm to
a child-it does not automatically result from the death of one parent.9
81.
82.
83.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 513; FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23.
Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 514.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

88.

Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 514.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 515.
91. Id. (referring to Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.
2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)).
92. Id. (following Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404,415-16 (Fla.1991)).
93. Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 515 (relying on M.N. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 648 So.

2d 769, 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
94. Id.
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In quashing the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court of95
Florida agreed with and followed the dissenting opinion of Judge Green.
Judge Green, arguing for the interests of the natural parent, noted that "it
appears to be an unassailable proposition that otherwise fit parents... who
have neither abused, neglected, or abandoned their child, have a reasonable
expectation that the state will not interfere with their decision to exclude or
limit the grandparents' visitation with their child. 96 Therefore, because the
grandparents had not proven that their grandchildren suffered demonstrable
harm under the care and supervision of Von Eiff and his new wife, they
failed to meet the standing requirement to argue their case. 97
Finally, the court in Von Eiff noted that despite the constitutional
hurdle, using a best interests analysis instead of mandating proof of
demonstrable harm to the child "permits the State to substitute its own views
regarding how a child should be raised for those of the parent. ''g The court
reasoned that doing this would99be "stripping [the parents] of their right to
control in parenting decisions."
2. After Von Eiff
Von Eiff strengthened the rights of the natural parent. By requiring a
showing of demonstrable harm to the child before entertaining a change of
custody from a natural parent to a nonparent, the court solidified the biological
mother's right to care for and make decisions for her child without government
intervention. °° Interpreting the right to privacy in Florida to include the right
to privacy in child rearing grants natural parents the autonomy deeply rooted in
our belief system as free individuals! 1 However, requiring a showing of
demonstrable harm adds an additional hurdle for a lesbian mother to overcome
in her battle to maintain a relationship with her child.
In Florida, the statutory ban on the creation of the nontraditional family
has forced the nonbiological mother in a lesbian partnership to use the
psychological parent status in order to gain standing at a custody hearing.1' 2
Proving the existence of her relationship was, until Von Eiff, her only
avenue. Although it had not been persuasive when applied to the lesbian
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Von Eiff,699 So. 2d 772, 781 (Green, J., dissenting).
Von Eiff,720 So. 2d at 516.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Von Eiff, 699 So. 2d at 780-85 (Green, J., dissenting). Judge Green noted that
only four other state constitutions contain an explicit right to privacy. Id. These include
Alaska, California, Hawaii, and Montana. Id.
102. See Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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psychological parent relationship, a small body of precedent was available to
work with.1°3 Due to the Von Eiff decision, those opportunities for relief are
no longer available to her. 1°4
Although the interpretation of the right to privacy in Von Eiff leaves
05
grandparents and stepparents with the same hurdles as the lesbian parent,'
it does not have the same crushing effect on heterosexual psychological
parents. If the natural parent consents, a heterosexual can adopt the child of
his or her spouse, which then places the new parent on equal footing with the
biological parent.10 6
Furthermore, the other parent in heterosexual unions is introduced as a
third party. Children in that situation either know or they are told about their
original parent. Often times, children maintain the relationships with their
natural parents while creating and fostering new relationships with their
psychological parents. Therefore, the effect of Von Eiff is different on a
lesbian who has been treated and considered an equal parent by her partner
and her child.
IV. Kazmierazak v. Query
A.

Background

Penny Kazmierazak and Pamela Query were involved in a long term,
lesbian relationship. 10 7 During the course of the relationship, the couple
decided to have a child through donor insemination!0 8 They chose Query as
the parent to carry the child. 9 Query delivered the couple's daughter on
December 24, 1993.0 On their baby's medical records, Kazmierazak was

103. See, e.g., Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).

104. The decision took away a lesbian, nonbiological parent's ability to claim status as
a psychological parent because the existence of that relationship will not be acknowledged as
a compelling state interest. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 516. The Von Eiffinterpretation of the
right to privacy changed the standing requirement in that it solidified the standard that
demonstrable harm to the child must be proven as the interest justifying state intervention. Id.
105. Seeki.
106. Id. The court noted that in adopting the child, Von Eiff's new wife had created
the same relationship between herself and the child as would have been had the child been her
biological daughter. Id.
107. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 98-2854).
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. Id.
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listed as a "parent" and "responsible party.""' She was also listed on the
Despite the family's belief that
baby's family tree as "moM. ' " 2
Kazmierazak was a mother of their baby, she had no biological ties with the
child.!1 3 Because Florida law bars homosexuals from marrying or adopting,
child. 4
the couple could not legally make Kazmierazak a parent of their
On April 7, 1998, soon after the couple ended their relationship,
Kazmierazak filed a Petition for Custody of their child." 5 Query responded
by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Kazmierazak was not a
legal parent of their child, she did not have standing to obtain custody or
visitation rights. 1 6 The trial court agreed that IKazmierazak lacked standing
Kazmierazak then appealed to the
and granted the motion to dismiss.
Fourth District Court of Appeal.1 8 This appeal
-19 was filed prior to the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Von EifJ.
B.

Kazmierazak'sArgument

Kazmierazak argued that determining a grant of custody turns on the
best interests of the child.1'2 She claimed that denying her the opportunity to
fight for her child based on a statutorily imposed lack of standing "disallows
any and all proof of the appellant's relationship to her little girl, treating a
a five-year-old child with the
loving parent as a total stranger and threatening
12 1
permanent loss of her primary caretaker."'
Kazmierazak's first contention was that Florida law allowed a
psychological parent to show that the best interests of the child are served
through continuing contact between the child and the psychological
parent. 122 She relied on Wills v. Wills,123 wherein a stepmother, given
standing as a psychological parent, was able to gain visitation rights over her
nonbiological, nonadoptive daughter based on the psychological and
111. Record at 77, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (No. 98-2854).
112. Id. at 78.
113. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).
115. Record at 1-3, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
116. Id.at 10-12.
117. Id.at 24-25.
118. Id. at 26-28.
119. Id. The notice of appeal was filed on August 11, 1998. Von Eiff was not decided
until November 12, 1998. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,510 (Fla. 1999).
120. Initial Brief of Appellant at 32, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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emotional ties that had developed during the relationship. 124 In that case,
Kazmierazak noted, visitation was authorized based on the best interests of
the child:
It seems to us that if an adequate record can be made demonstrating
that it is in the child's best interest that such visitation be
authorized the trial judge's discretion in the matter is sufficiently
broad to allow him to authorize visitation with a non-parent.
Certainly this type of visitation, contrary to the wishes of the
custodial parent, should be awarded with great circumspection. But
if the welfare of the child is promoted by such visitation and there
is no other substantial interest12adversely affected the trial judge
should be allowed that latitude. 5
Kazmierazak continued by arguing that denying her a hearing to determine
whether she possessed a relationship with her daughter worthy of granting
custody was a violation of her privacy rights as a parent. 126
Second, Kazmierazak argued that there was a large body of case
precedent that granted standing to persons similarly situated who had shown
themselves to be in a parental relationship with a child.'2 She added that
this precedent supported her claim to be given the opportunity to establish
the same type of relationship. 12
Kazmierazak's third argument focused on the court's protection of
children of lesbian parents. 9 She argued that across the country cases
involving lesbian parents had been decided based on the best interests of the
child.130 Kazmierazak reasoned that, similar to these cases, the Wills

124. Id.; Initial Brief of Appellant at 8, Kazrmierazak(No. 98-2854).
125. Initial Brief of Appellant at 8, Kazierazak (No. 98-2854) (quoting Wills v.
Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1981).
126. Id. at 11.
127. Id. at 11-18. Kazmierazak relied on Florida cases Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d
1271 (Fla. 1996), Padgett v. Departmentof Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565
(Fla. 1991), Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1953), Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), Simmons v. Pinckney, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
Golstein v. Golstein, 442 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and Heffernan v.
Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
128. Initial Brief of Appellant at 13, Kazinierazak (No. 98-2854).
129. Id. at 18-26.
130. Id. JAL v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996), Holtzman v. Knott, 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), and A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. App. 1992), are three cases
wherein the petitioners were lesbian nonbiological mothers who were granted the opportunity
to fight for custody and visitation rights of their children.
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decision required the court to
131 hear her case and determine what would best
promote her child's welfare.
The fourth argument focused on the family that she and her partner had
worked to create and maintain.132 Kazmierazak argued that the couple
intended to make a family with her being the parent of their child. 133 The
medical records and family planning records showed that the couple
intended to create a family-not that Query had a daughter for whom
Kazmierazak would be a caretaker. 13 She argued that these135arrangements
were sufficient to establish standing as a psychological parent.
Kazmierazak's final argument was one made on behalf of her
daughter.136 She supported her argument with research showing that
children able to maintain relationships with both parents were more
content.1 37 She also stated that Florida law supported the proposition that
children and
138 noncustodial parents should partake in "frequent and continuing
contact."
When she petitioned for custody and again in her brief, Kazmierazak
mentioned that Query may not have been a fit person to care for their
daughter alone. 139 However, she offered no proof to validate this contention.
Kazmierazak concluded that she deserved an opportunity to establish the
bond between her and her daughter.14° Moreover, she claimed that precedent
turned on the
best interests of the child and not on the family into which she
4
was born.' '
C.

Query's Argument

Query considered Kazmierazak a stranger to the relationship between
Query and her biological daughter. 142 Query first argued that in a custody
suit between a parent and a third party, the natural parent's rights must be
131. Initial Brief of Appellant at 25, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
132. Id. at 26-30.
133. Id. at 27-28.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id. at 26-30.
136. Initial Brief of Appellant at 30-31, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
137. Id. at 30. Kazmierazak explained that whether children are raised in straight or
gay households, they have the same needs for stability and security. Id. at 31. Denying
children of gay parents relegates them to second-class status. Id.
138. Id. at 30.
139. Record at 2,Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(No. 98-2854); Initial Brief of Appellant at 3,Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
140. Initial Brief of Appellant at 32, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
141. Id.
142. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4, 7, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
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considered.1 43 She claimed that although the best interests standard is
applied when the dispute arises between two natural parents, this tougher
standard applied to her case as she was a natural parent in a custody battle
with a third party. 44
Secondly, Query argued that she should not have to defend her rights to
her child against a stranger without a showing of unfitness or
" 5 She stated that because a third party does not have legal or
abandonment. T4
financial obligations toward the child of another, a third party does not have
any rights to the child either. 46 Furthermore, she argued that natural parents
should not have to fear that their children could be taken away from them by
one who is not related by blood or marriage. 47
Query's third argument focused on the visitation rights of a
that visitation rights of a nonparent were
nonparent.148 She claimed
established by statute.149 She therefore contended that because Kazmierazak
as having any type of relationship
was not recognized by statute
150 with her
....
daughter, Kazmierazak was barred from claiming custody rights.
Finally, Query argued that no cause of action arose in that a stranger
sought custody of a child without a compelling state interest defined by
statute.' 51 Because Kazmierazak was unable to involve state action through
a dependency proceeding, an adoption petition, or a dissolution of marriage,
Query argued that
52 Kazmierazak was unable to state a cause of action for
taking her child.1

143. Id. at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 4-6.
146. Id.
147. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4-6, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
148. Id. at 6-7.
149. Id. "Visitation rights are, with regard to a nonparent, statutory, and the court has
no inherent authority to award visitation." Meeks v. Gamer, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992). See also Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995). In Music, the court refused to grant standing to a lesbian nonbiological mother
who had not argued her case under any statutory scheme. Id.
150. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4-6, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
151. Id. at 7-8. The government has the power to intervene in a family only when
there is a showing that the welfare of the child is at stake. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1275-76 (Fla. 1996).
152. Initial Brief of Appellee at 7-8, Kazinierazak (No. 98-2854). The nonparent
seeking to take a child out of a detrimental environment has three statutory options. Id. The
nonparent can file a petition for dependency. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (1999). A grandparent
may file for visitation during a divorce. Id. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c. The nonparent may petition for
adoption proving that the biological parent has abandoned the child. Id. § 63.072(1).
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Query concluded that Kazmierazak had not even shown that it was in
the best interests of their child to give her custody or visitation. '5 As far as
claiming rights to their child, Query argued that Kazmierazak was not on
equal footing with her but rather was at the level of a stepparent,
grandparent, or sibling.1 4 Because custody or visitation is not granted to
persons identified by those categories absent a compelling state interest,
Query reasoned that custody or visitation
55 should not have been granted to
Kazmierazak absent that same showing.
D.

The Decision

Three months after the notice of appeal was received, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided Von Eiff.156 This decision, which defined Florida's
constitutional right to privacy in terms of child rearing, shattered any chance
Kazmierazak had of claiming rights to her child as a psychological parent.
Because she identified herself as a psychological parent, the issue before the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether a psychological parent has the
same rights in terms of child rearing as a biological parent.15 7 By definition,
a psychological parent can never be on equal footing with a biological
parent. 18 The court recognized this fact and noted5 9that Von Eiff changed the
legally recognized status of psychological parents.
First, the court noted that common law did not recognize a
psychological parent. 6° The court also noted that Kazmierazak had not
petitioned for custody under a statutory scheme. 61 Second, the court stated,
that concerning a custody battle between a nonadoptive, nonbiological
parent and a natural, biological parent, the law recognizes the biological
parent's constitutionally protected right to privacy.162 Applying Von Eiff, the
court equated Kazmierazak' s rights to those of a grandparent or a stepparent,
instead of equating her rights to those of a natural parent.
It is this
distinction and categorization that required the court to decide the case based
153. Initial Brief of Appellee at 7-8, Kazmierazak,(No. 98-2845).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
157. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Nitti, supra note 19, at 1003.
159. Kazmnierazak; 736 So. 2d at 110.
160. Id. at 107.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 110. The court stated that "in light of Von Eiff, [it could not] construe
these cases as holding a psychological parent is entitled to parental status equivalent to the
biological parent." Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 110.
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on whether Query's decisions would cause demonstrable harm to their child.
Because Query had a right to privacy in making parental decisions,
Kazmierazak first would have to prove that livinawith the biological mother
would cause her daughter demonstrable harm.'
Only after Kazmierazak
proved this would she have met the standing requirement permitting her to
request custody and prove that placing their daughter in her custody would
be in the child's best interests. 6s Specifically, it would have to be
Kazmierazak's burden in proving that Query was an unfit mother that
granted her standing./6 Due to the Von Eff decision, proof of her role as a
psychological parent would no longer suffice. 167
However, as the court noted, Kazmierazak did not argue that leaving
their daughter in the custody of Query would cause her to suffer
demonstrable harm.16s She only argued that it was in the child's best
interests to keep a connection with her psychological mother. 169 Because the
child's best interests falls short of the compelling interest required before the
7 of a biological parent, the court was compelled
state can invade the
privacy
of Query. y,
favor
in
rule
to
The court examined the cases Kazmierazak relied upon to support her
position.171 The court pointed out that each case was decided before Von
E/if,and, therefore, did not address the issue of standing. 172 The court also
noted that the cases Kaznierazak relied upon were decided without meeting
the threshold requirement of demonstrable harm to the child.1 73 Because
Von Eiff changed the standard, Kazmierazak was left without authority to
contradict Query's right to privacy.1 74 Therefore, she had not met the more
arduous standing requirement to argue for her rights as a mother.

164. See id.at 109.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 110.

168. Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 107. The court felt that this argument was not pushed
to the forefront of the case to make an argument of demonstrable harm. See id. at 109. Harm
to the child was mentioned by Kazmierazak in a footnote of her brief. Id. However, it was not
incorporated as a main argument for relief. Id.
169. Id. at 107.
170. Kaznierazak,736 So. 2d at 110.
171. Id. at 108-09.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
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V. THE MISIDENTIFICATION OF LESBIAN OTHER MOTHERS
The error in this case is not in the decision, but rather in the labeling of
Kazmierazak as a third party, as a stranger, and even as psychological parent.
Grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, and anybody who assumes the role
of a parent can be classified as a psychological parent. They are all third
parties to the nuclear family that at some point in time existed. In situations
like these, the biological or adoptive parents should be given that extra layer
of protection from the state constitution to guard their families from outside
individuals.
Contrary to this, in a lesbian relationship that utilizes donor
insemination, there is no third party. The other mother is not thought of as a
third party until the couple separates. The intention of the two women from
the first moment of family planning is to have two parents. The fact that
they are two women is only a legal problem when the nonbiological mother
wants to continue the relationship with her child. 175
The cases Kazmierazak relied upon were distinguishable from her case.
However, the difference was not that the cases were decided before the right
to privacy in parental decisionmaking was clarified. The distinguishing
factor was that Kazmierazak's situation was one where no other remedy was
available. 176
In Wills v. Wills,'" the court awarded visitation rights to the
psychological mother of a twelve-year-old girl.
The father and mother
adopted the child when she was only three years old just prior to the
mother's death.179 When the girl was four years old, her father remarried,
and the new couple raised the child together for seven years until the time
they were divorced.180 The court held that the psychological bond that had
developed between the psychological mother and the daughter was strong

175. Because of the right to privacy afforded by both the United States Constitution
and the Florida Constitution, the state cannot interfere with the right of a woman to procreate.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CoNsr. art. I., § 23; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431

U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). The state then
uses the same constitutional right to privacy to deny the other mother in that lesbian
relationship from maintaining the relationship that the state allowed her to create. See
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
176. Because she is statutorily precluded from creating the legal relationship, the
lesbian other mother is treated as a third party.
177. 339 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
178. Id. at 1131.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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enough to irant visitation even though there was no legally recognized
relationship.
In Simmons v. Pinkey,l 8 the child was a fourteen-year-old girl who had
been living with her foster mother for thirteen years.
When she was less
than two years old, her father killed her biological mother and was sent to
prison.1 4 The court denied the father custody of his daughter, and instead
ruled that she should remain in the custody of her foster mother.- 5
In Heffernan v. Goldstein,1 6 the court granted custody of the two
children to the stepmother against the natural mother after the death of the
children's father.' The children had been living with their father since their
mother and father divorced eleven years earlier. r The court did this despite
the fact that the father and stepmother had only been married six months
when the father died. 189 The court weighed heavily the children's request to
remain with their stepmother.1 °
Kazmierazak's argument cannot be supported by the authority she cited.
First, the nonbiological parents in the cited cases were not barred from
creating a legal relationship with their children. Because they were
heterosexual, they were able to marry the biological parent or adopt the
children.'9 1 Although adoption and marriage are both options that require
the consent of the natural parents, these actions were legal options for the
people involved in the cited cases.M
Second, in Wills and Heffernan, the nonparent had created the in loco
parentis relationship with the child through marriage. 193 Statutory law
permitting couples of the opposite sex to marry formed this relationship. In
addition, it and provided a legal opportunity for these parents to be afforded
rights to their stepchildren.1 4

181. Id.
182. 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

183. Id. at 523.
184. Id.
185. Id. at524-25.
186. 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id.

191. FLA.

STAT.

§§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).

192. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212.
193. Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Heffeman v.
Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
194. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
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Third, and most importantly, the psychological parents in these cases
had taken the place, or filled in, for the natural parent. At no time did any
of them claim to be the real parent. Each knew that they were a replacement
for the already existing and absent parent. These de facto parents
represented the true definition of a psychological parent. 196 ' They
had
97
fulfilled the child's psychological and physical needs for a parent."
Distinguishing these cases from the present situation, it is clear that
Kazmierazak is not a psychological parent. She did not take the place of an
already existing parent. Her daughter knew only two parents from birth.
Kazmierazak planned for the child, coached her partner through lamaze,
watched the birth of her daughter, and cared for her for seven years. It was
not as if she began dating a woman who already had a daughter or made the
choice to care for a child that was not hers. Kazmierazak was denied her
daughter because the couple was biologically unable to create a child
together. The previous choice to have Query as the birth mother now keeps
her from continuing the parent-child relationship.
Furthermore,
Kazmierazak and Query's daughter did not have psychological or physical
needs for a parent, because she had two parents present in the home.
Currently in Florida, a legal title does not exist that defines
Kazmierazak's relationship to her daughter. Although she is her mother, she
cannot be recognized as such because she and her daughter do not share
biological ties. Although the only title she can give herself is that of
psychological parent, this grossly under classifies the relationship and is no
longer recognized as a threshold determination of standing.
This narrow fact pattern, where two women plan for and raise a family
together, must be examined differently than the biological versus
psychological parent battles. It must also be examined differently than from
a situation where both of the parents have biological or adoptive ties to the
child. Essentially, in lesbian planned parenting situations such as that which
existed between Kazmierazak and Query, there should be a threshold
standing requirement. This requirement should fall between the compelling
interest of a person's right to privacy and the best interests of the child
analysis.
The biological parent's right to privacy must, in a custody battle with a
psychological parent, continue to be a pretext to determining with whom a
child belongs. Concerning two biological or adoptive parents, the best
interests of the child standard is a favorable way to determine custody
disputes. However, between a lesbian couple, the biological mother's right
to privacy should not be a barricade to the other mother's chance to continue
195. Simmons v. Pinkey, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Wills, 399 So.
2d at 1131; Heffernan, 256 So. 2d at 523.
196. See Nitti, supra note 19, at 1003.
197. See id.
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in parenting her child. The other mother in a lesbian custody battle should
be required to prove her relationship to her child before progressing to the
best interests of the child analysis. However, legal decisions based on198a
mother's sexual preference preempt her from proving that relationship.
Because the Florida Legislature bars a lesbian mother from becoming a legal
part of her family, the courts should provide her alternatives.
VI. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
At least one jurisdiction has permitted parents to show that continuing a
relationship would be in the child's best interests after a threshold showing
of a parent-like relationship.1 9 Holtzman v. Knott," is a case which stands
on all fours with the Kazmierazak and Query's situation. 2° 1 In that case, the
lesbian couple chose to have a child by donor insemination, raised their son
together, and separated when he was five years old.2° The trial court
reluctantly decided against granting Holtzman custody or visitation rights. 203
The court reasoned:
[Tihis [is] a case where a family member ought to have the right to
visit and keep an eye on the welfare of a minor child with whom
she has developed a parent-like relationship. Unfortunately because
the law does not recognize the alternative type of relationship
which existed in 4this case, this court can not offer the relief
Holtzman seeks.2
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin analyzed the case beyond the
statutory hurdles. 205 It developed a test enabling a nonparent to prove first
that a parent-like relationship with the child exists and then that a
"significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the child's
relationship with a biological or adoptive parent." 206 The court held that the
four elements required to prove a parent-like relationship were:

198. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Music
v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
199. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
200. Id. at 419.
201. Id.
202. Id.at 421-22.
203. Id.at 422-23.
204. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 422-23.
205. Id.at 424-25.
206. Id.at 421.
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(1)
that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the [nonparent's] formation and establishment of a parentlike relationship with the child;
(2)
that the [nonparent] and the child lived together in the same
household;
(3)
that the [nonparent] assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and
development, including contributing towards the child's support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and
(4)
that the [nonparent] has been in a parental role for a length
the child a bonded,
of time sufficient to have established with
2
dependent relationship parental in nature. W
The court further held that the two elements required to prove a significant
triggering event which would justify the state interfering in the relationship
between the child and the natural parent were that the biological or adoptive
parent "has interfered substantially with the [nonparent's] parent-like
relationship with the child and that the [nonparent] sought court ordered
visitations Within a reasonable time" after the parent's interference. 208 The
court reasoned that after this showing, the nonparent may then proceed in
persuading the court as to the best interests of the child.21
The test created in Holtzman has since been adopted by New Jersey.21 0
In March 1999, the Superior Court of New Jersey, in V.C. v. M.J.B., 21 1 used
the test to determine
that the lesbian nonbiological mother was entitled to
2
visitation rights.
Because Florida law treats all nonbiological and nonadoptive parents as
"third parties" who have to show demonstrable harm to the child in order to
cut through the protective right to privacy layer surrounding the natural
parent, 21 3 this test, in its original form, is inapplicable in Florida. However,
with some alteration, but without chipping away at the biological mother's
right to privacy, this test can be formatted to address those in the same
position as Kazmierazak and Query.
The altered test would have to require proof of a committed relationship
between two homosexuals who planned a family through donor
insemination. There would need to be proof that prior to the baby's birth,
the couple prepared together for his or her arrival. Most importantly, the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421.
V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
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nonbiological parent would have to prove that she is the only other person
the child considers a parent beside the biological mother. The revised test
for Florida could require that, in order for a lesbian nonbiological mother to
be awarded visitation of the biological child of her former partner, she must
first prove: 1) that she and the biological mother planned and prepared for
the birth of the child together; 214 2) that the biological mother took specific
steps to recognize her as the other parent of their child, consenting to and
fostering her formation and establishment of a parental relationship with the
child; 21-3) that she lived with and was a member of the household with the
2 16
biological mother and the child, assuming the characterization of a family;
4) that she assumed the parental obligations by taking significant
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development, including
contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial
compensation; 217 5) that she maintained her parental role from the prebirth
stage, building a bonded, dependant relationship with her child, and
attempted to continue in that role after the couple separated; 2 18 and 6) that
the child has always known the biological and nonbiological mother to be
her only two parents. 1 9
Applying this test as a threshold standing requirement would not
conflict with the existing statutory law forbidding adoption and marriage by
homosexuals.22
Neither would it open the door to all persons, not
biologically related, seeking custody or visitation rights.221 The bond
between a biological parent and a child should be afforded special
protection. The right to privacy in child rearing is a protection for the
natural parent that should not be violated absent an interest of the highest
214. The act of planning for the child separates the lesbian other mother from all other

situations where a person takes the place of another, already existing parent.
215. This is similar to the first element of the Holtzman test. See Holtzman, 533

N.W.2d at 421.
216. See the second element of the Holtzman test. Id. at 421. This is another way of

distinguishing the lesbian other mother from those that are not part of the nuclear family who
try to gain rights to the child, for example, a grandparent. See id.
217. See id. See the third element of the Holtzman test. Id. at 421.
218. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421. This is more stringent than the fourth element
of the Holtzman test. Id.
219. This final element is added to reinforce the importance of the plan by the two
women to create a family from the beginning with two parents, both of them women. Id.
220. This test would not challenge sections 63.042(3) and 741.212 of the Florida
Statutes. Instead, the test challenges the court system to look beyond legislation to find the
best result instead of being irrevocably bound by it.
221. The fear that this test would create a slippery slope, leading to a deterioration of

the right to privacy, is without merit. This test is specially designed for the limited cases of
lesbian nonbiological mothers who have been left without any legal options because of the
Von Eiffdecision.
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degree. This standing requirement should continue to apply to psychological
parents. However, similar to a married couple who plans an adoption or a
married couple who partakes in donor insemination, the decision by a
lesbian couple to raise the child is a two-part team effort from the first time
the topic is discussed. The nonbiological parent in this situation creates a
stronger relationship than the title "psychological parent" affords. This
established relationship should not only be granted the opportunity to
continue after a showing of unfitness of, or abandonment by, the natural
parent.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is easy to conclude that lesbian mothers who fight for custody of their
children are a minority, and, therefore, will never make a deep enough
impact in family custody battle for which they would deserve a special
standing requirement. However, as the nontraditional family continues to
grow, the law will be forced to grow with it. The result of this special
requirement affects the child of this broken partnership more than it does the
mothers. Children in nontraditional families are as entitled to remain in
contact with their parents after a separation as are children whose mother
and father get divorced. The law functions to protect children from being
pawns in their parents' games of hate. The lack of legal recognition of the
lesbian nonbiological parent in Florida means that the battle is over before
she enters the courtroom.
Although this battle may be between the two parents, or even between
the nonbiological parent and the law, the effect is most strongly felt by the
child. Unfortunately, the only thing the child understands is that her mother
has been taken away.
Stacy A. Warman
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